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1. Introduction 
 
 Governments pursue fiscal decentralization for a variety of reasons: to make government 
more responsive and accountable to the people, to increase the efficiency of the public sector, 
and to promote national cohesion.1 Generally speaking, public sector economists emphasize the 
accountability and efficiency benefits of decentralization and neglect the union preserving 
benefits. Consequently, decentralization policy-making often becomes a technical exercise in 
‘getting the incentives right’ when designing a country’s fiscal architecture. From this 
perspective, obstacles to fiscal decentralization consist of misaligned or perverse incentives 
created by ill-conceived or improperly implemented fiscal arrangements. The goal of policy-
makers therefore is to develop a blueprint for a country’s fiscal architecture in line with the 
principles derived from the normative theory of fiscal decentralization and international best 
practices.2 
 For example, advocates of decentralization generally agree that, after accounting for 
economies of scale and inter-jurisdictional spillovers, government services should be provided 
by the level of government closest to the people.3 The contention is that, all else equal, the 
                                                 
1 Rémy Prud’homme (1995), David O. Sewell (1996), and Vito Tanzi (2000) describe some of the potential dangers 
of fiscal decentralization, particularly macroeconomic instability that may result from undisciplined borrowing by 
sub-national governments. For an introduction to the consequences of ‘soft budget constraints’ in a federal system 
and a survey of the institutional measures used by a number of federal governments to harden sub-national budget 
constraints, see Yingyi Qian and Gérard Roland (1998) and Jonathan A. Rodden, Gunnar S. Eskeland, and Jennie 
Litvack (2003). 
2 The conventional view of the normative theory of fiscal decentralization is based on the classic article by Charles 
M. Tiebout (1956) in which mobile citizens sort themselves among jurisdictions providing the best tax-expenditure 
bundle. Wallace E. Oates (1972) elaborates on this model. While there are many excellent treatments of the 
normative theory of fiscal decentralization, Roy Bahl (1999, 2000) are accessible treatments. In addition, Jameson 
Boex and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (2003) provide an excellent introduction to the topic in the context of developing 
countries, using the case of Tanzania to illustrate the concepts of fiscal decentralization. 
3 Wallace E. Oates (1972, page 35) provides perhaps the first and certainly one of the most elegant statements of the 
decentralization theorem: “For a public good – the consumption of which is defined over geographical subsets of the 
total population, and for which the costs of providing each level of output of the good in each jurisdiction are the 
same for the central or the respective local government – it will always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for 
local governments to provide the Pareto-efficient levels of output for their respective jurisdictions than for the 
central government to provide any specified and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions.” 
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government closest to the people knows best their tastes and preferences for local public services 
and will be more responsive and accountable to the demands of its constituents. The 
conventional wisdom regarding the assignment of expenditure functions in federal systems, 
although not precisely defined, recognizes of course that some government services are not 
effectively carried out at the local level. Income redistribution, for example, should be an 
exclusive competency of the central government. This view follows from the recognition that 
assigning redistributive expenditure programs to local governments may result in fiscal rent 
seeking in which low-income families move into jurisdictions offering more generous benefits. 
High-income families move out of these jurisdictions to escape the higher taxes required to 
finance these benefits. In the long-run, the tax bases of redistributive local jurisdictions are 
eroded, the quality of local services deteriorates, and low income families are left isolated in 
ghettos. 
 Moreover, according to the conventional wisdom, local government services should be 
financed at the margin from the local government’s own source revenues. The rationale for this 
principle is that residents of a jurisdiction will not internalize the true marginal cost of providing 
local government services, if they do not face the tax price of providing them, and consequently 
the local government sector may grow too big. As a result, the promised benefits of greater 
allocative efficiency through decentralization may not be realized in practice. In short, the 
conventional wisdom generally calls for local governments to have a significant range of 
exclusive expenditure responsibilities along with sufficient revenue autonomy – at a minimum 
tax rate setting authority - to enable them to provide marginal financing of their expenditure 
responsibilities.4 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Charles E. McClure, Jr. (1983) for a more complete discussion of the rationale for requiring each 
level of government to finance expenditures from own source revenues at the margin. 
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 Although the foregoing discussion does not provide a complete description of the 
normative theory of fiscal decentralization, it does describe two of its major concerns, namely 
the rational for expenditure decentralization and the importance of establishing a Wicksellian 
link between public tax prices and public services.5 While recognizing the importance of ‘getting 
the incentives right’, the conventional wisdom of fiscal decentralization theory does not account 
for a major motivation for fiscal decentralization. The conventional wisdom neglects the 
importance of federalism as a set of institutional arrangements designed to preserve the union of 
a country. Union preserving federalism is a particularly important consideration in low income 
countries with weak national identities, like many of those in sub-Saharan Africa. We use the 
case of Tanzania to motivate our concept of union preserving federalism. Tanzania is a 
worthwhile example to study because it is actively engaged in fiscal decentralization reforms and 
shares many of the fundamental challenges to decentralization of many other sub-Saharan 
African countries. 
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
description of the history, geography, and economy of the United Republic of Tanzania. Section 
3 briefly describes Tanzania’s current fiscal architecture. In doing so, we identify some of the 
weaknesses of the current fiscal arrangements in Tanzania from the perspective of the normative 
theory of fiscal decentralization. In section 4, we discuss five fundamental obstacles to fiscal 
decentralization in Tanzania and many other sub-Saharan African countries. More specifically, 
we examine ethnic fragmentation, widespread poverty, competition for natural resource rents, 
human resource capacity constraints, and weak and missing institutions that characterize many 
                                                 
5 Generally speaking, the normative theory of fiscal decentralization concerns the so-called four pillars of fiscal 
decentralization: expenditure assignments, revenue assignments, intergovernmental transfers, and borrowing 
autonomy. To this edifice, we would add financial management and accountability mechanisms. For a more detailed 
description of the normative theory of fiscal decentralization, Wallace E. Oates (1972) is arguably the seminal work 
on this topic. Another excellent introduction to the normative theory of fiscal decentralization is Roy Bahl (1999). 
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sub-Saharan countries. Ironically, some of these obstacles represent, in our opinion, the very 
raison d’être for decentralization. The challenge facing Tanzania and other sub-Saharan 
countries is to develop institutions to cope with these challenges. Using the case of Tanzania, we 
try to show that a properly conceived and implemented framework for decentralized governance 
is an important strategy for doing so, but it may entail difficult trade-offs with some of the policy 
prescriptions derived from the normative theory of fiscal federalism. Section 5 provides a 
summary of our main conclusions. 
2.  The United Republic of Tanzania 
 The United Republic of Tanzania (GoT) is situated on the eastern coast of Africa and is 
bordered by Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda to the north, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo to the west, and Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia to the south. Figure 1 provides a map 
of Tanzania showing the regional divisions of the GoT. Its land area, about 945,000 km2, is 
almost one and a half times the size of France. The country’s forty million people are about 95 
percent ethnic Bantu but belong to as many as 130 different tribes. The population is surprisingly 
spread out across the geographical area of mainland Tanzania.6 The most populated of the 21 
mainland regions contains about 9 percent of the population, and the least populated contains 
about 2.5 percent. The average regional population is about 5 percent of the total population of 
mainland Tanzania. Although only about 8 percent of the population of the mainland resides in 
Dar es Salaam, it is the economic engine of the country. About 2.5 percent of the population 
lives on the Zanzibar archipelago which consists of two main islands, Pemba and Unguja, and 
some, mostly uninhabited, smaller islets. According to the CIA World Factbook, the population 
                                                 
6 This may in part be a result of the significant intergovernmental transfers that have taken place over the past 
decades.  These, along with other migration barriers, may have induced people to stay put and mitigated the kind of 
urban migration seen in other developing countries. 
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of Zanzibar is historically Arabic and 99 percent Muslim; thus making it culturally and ethnically 
distinct from the population of mainland Tanzania.     
 Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world. According to the United Nations’ 
Human Development Report, Tanzania’s per-capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was $744 in 
2005 (measured at purchasing power parity), as compared to $42,000 for the United States, 
$10,700 for Mexico, and $2,800 for Bolivia. According to the 2006 Human Development Index, 
Tanzania ranks 152 out of 179 countries. More than 80 percent of the population works in the 
agricultural sector, which generates less than 30 percent of the country’s GDP. The average life 
expectancy in Tanzania is about 52 years.  
 The GoT consists of 26 regional governments. Mainland Tanzania is divided into 21 
political regions and 120 local government authorities (LGA), and the Zanzibar archipelago is 
divided into 5 additional regions. Tables 1 and 2 provide information on the geographic and 
socio-economic profiles of the regions of Tanzania. As table 1 shows, with the exception of Dar 
es Salaam, the population density of mainland Tanzania is fairly uniform, and the rate of 
urbanization is rather low at approximately 22.6 percent of the population residing in urban 
areas. Table 2 shows the gross domestic regional product in current prices for 2005, the adult 
literacy rate, infant mortality rate, and HIV-positive rate, by region. The adult literacy rate for 
mainland Tanzania is 71 percent, the poverty rate in terms of basic needs is 35.7 percent of the 
population, and the infant mortality is 99 per 1,000 live births. Except for the HIV-positive rate, 
the coefficient of variation for these socio-economic indicators is remarkably small for mainland 
Tanzania. The HIV infection rate is relatively high in Kilimanjaro at 14.7 percent; whereas, the 
average rate for Mainland Tanzania is slightly less than 6 percent. 
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 Table 3 provides a profile of Tanzania’s system of LGA’s. The typical LGA employs 
1,742 people and serves about 300,000 local residents. The employee compensation cost of these 
services was $434 million in 2007, which amounts to about 3 percent of the total value added of 
the economy. Another 1.2 percent of GDP is for other recurring expenditures by LGA’s and 
about 2 percent of GDP is created through nonrecurring or development LGA spending, which 
can be considered to be some form of capital spending.  In other words the LGA system creates 
about 6.2 percent of the country’s GDP. 
3.  The architecture of GoT’s fiscal decentralization system 
 To understand the fiscal arrangements of GoT, it is helpful to start with the political 
relationship between the central government and the local governments. Since a local 
government reform program was put in place in 1999, the stated policy of the central government 
has been ‘decentralization by devolution’. The goal of these reforms is the devolution of specific 
government service responsibilities to the local level, along with the dismantling of the central 
and regional hierarchical government structure that previously managed these responsibilities. 
This includes turning over most budget allocation decisions and financial management 
responsibilities to the locally elected leaders of the local government authorities (LGA), of which 
there are about 133 across the 21 regions of the mainland. 
 To carry out this devolution of government responsibility the former Ministry of 
Regional Administration and Local Government (MRALG) became the Prime Minister’s Office 
of Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG). According to the central 
government’s website (http://www.pmoralg.go.tz), the mandate of this new office is to “facilitate 
the empowerment of Tanzanians through autonomous local government institutions geared to 
reducing poverty… [and to] champion decentralization by devolution and create the requisite 
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conditions for Local Government Authorities to deliver quality services efficiently and 
equitably”. The PMO-RALG has a Regional Secretariat in each of the twenty-one regions. The 
duties of the Regional Secretariat are as follows: 1) to ensure peace and tranquility in the regions, 
2) to represent the central government in the regions, and 3) to assist and facilitate the local 
government authorities to discharge their responsibilities.  
 Notwithstanding the policy of decentralization by devolution, the PMO-RALG and the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) continue to maintain considerable influence over the fiscal activities 
of local governments through the Regional Secretariat. The PMO-RALG provides budget 
guidelines and standards, and it audits local governments to ensure that they are adhering to these 
standards. It monitors local budgets, helps to create policy initiatives, provides technical capacity 
as needed, and does technical training. One of the more recent publications - the Local 
Government Review 2007 - reports that 21.4 percent of total government spending was carried 
out by LGAs in fiscal year (FY) 2006-07, but local governments do not have much discretion 
over this spending because of restrictions on the central government’s formula-based, sectoral 
block grants to local governments, which fund almost all of the spending by local governments. 
The elaborate governmental infrastructure of the PMO-RALG, depicted in Figure 2, further 
illustrates the high degree to which the PMO-RALG and the Regional Secretariat are involved in 
local government operations.   
  It is apparent that the promotion of decentralization by devolution is difficult. Even after 
a ten-year policy push, the central government continues to participate in almost every aspect of 
the LGAs fiscal activities. It is noteworthy that significant obstacles to implementation of 
decentralization policy seem to exist even for a government that ‘buys into’ the notion that the 
benefits of fiscal decentralization are worth pursuing. The extensive and persistent involvement 
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of the central government in the fiscal activities of the LGA’s in Tanzania must be borne in mind 
as we consider the extent to which the enabling legislation of fiscal decentralization describes 
actual practices and effective local autonomy. 
The Zanzibar issue 
 A reader familiar with the relationship between the Revolutionary Government of 
Zanzibar (GoZ) and the GoT may reasonably assume that a discussion of the obstacles to 
decentralization in Tanzania would focus on the Zanzibar issue, but that is not the case here. The 
fiscal relationship between the GoZ and the GoT may ultimately need to be rationalized, but for 
the time being at least the Constitution grants the GoZ almost complete political and fiscal 
autonomy.7 
 The Constitution of the GoT provides for the establishment of the GoZ, the Zanzibar 
Revolutionary Council, and the House of Representatives of Zanzibar; none of which are 
required to report to the GoT. Moreover, Article 138 of the GoT’s Constitution 
(http://www.tanzania.go.tz) states that the House of Representatives of Zanzibar may “… impose 
tax of any kind in accordance with the authority of that house.” The Constitution of GoT also 
establishes a Joint Finance Commission (JFC) to determine Zanzibar’s contribution to and 
allocation from the GoT’s budget, but the JFC was only recently constituted and staffed with 
technical experts and to date has made little progress and exercised little influence on such 
matters.  
                                                 
7 There appears to be considerable political tension between GoZ and GoT. For example, some of the key original 
historical documents that created the union between Zanzibar and the mainland government have been lost, and 
some scholars question the accuracy and authenticity of the alleged duplicates of the originals. This is just one 
prominent example of the suspicion that exists between these two governments and communities. See, for example, 
Greg Cameron (2002) for a description of Zanzibari’s distrust of the 1964 union with mainland Tanzania, and 
Zanzibar’s contemporary transition toward authoritarianism, which is in sharp contrast to the transition toward 
multi-party politics on the mainland. 
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Today, the finances of the two governments are effectively independent of one another. 
The only significant agreement between the two being the following: the GoZ should receive a 
4.5 percent share of most (non-project-specific) international grant monies; the GoZ should 
receive 4.5 percent of the dividends of the Bank of Tanzania; and the GoZ should receive the 
excise taxes on goods manufactured on the mainland but consumed on Zanzibar.  
The fiscal autonomy that the Constitution provides to the GoZ creates risks to the fiscal, 
economic, and political stability of the union. The GoZ could exercise its fiscal autonomy to 
adopt changes to its tax bases and rates vis-á-vis those of the GoT. This would increase the costs 
of tax compliance and tax administration, create opportunities for tax arbitrage, foster tax 
competition between the mainland and the island governments, create impediments to internal 
trade, and create difficulties in the East African Community with respect to custom duties. To 
date the GoZ has not exercised its fiscal autonomy to differentiate its tax system from that of the 
mainland. Rather it has chosen to act responsibly, in our view, by adopting conforming tax 
legislation.8 That is, the tax bases and rates of GoZ’s income tax, value-added tax, and customs 
duties are generally consistent with those of GoT.  
 The GoZ also exercises borrowing autonomy. The risk of allowing sub-national 
governments to borrow is that they do not take into account the impact of their borrowing on the 
credit worthiness of the nation as a whole. Furthermore, the central government may not be able 
to adopt a credible ‘no bailout’ policy. The combination of the GoZ’s unfettered borrowing 
autonomy and the inability of the GoT to commit to a credible no bailout policy may give rise to 
                                                 
8 Joint Finance Commission (2006) provides further details on the fiscal relations between the GoZ and GoT. 
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a soft budget constraint.9 This could result in a lack of fiscal discipline by GoZ that could, at 
some future date, lead to macroeconomic instability.  
 The existing fiscal arrangements between the GoZ and the GoT create perverse incentives 
that put at risk the fiscal and economic stability of the union and thus, from the perspective of the 
normative theory of fiscal decentralization, call for reform of the intergovernmental fiscal 
system. Despite these risks, the current arrangements may be union preserving. GoZ’s de jure 
autonomy in fiscal matters, though it does not exercise this autonomy in practice, may strengthen 
the hand of the GoZ in negotiations with GoT, or it may provide comfort to the GoZ that 
important institutions are in place to exit the union when and if it decided to do so. Although this 
political accommodation arguably violates the conventional wisdom regarding the appropriate 
arrangements for central government revenue assignments and regulation of sub-national 
borrowing authority, these arrangements may reflect a reasonable compromise with the 
prescriptions of the normative theory in order to preserve the union. 
 Tanzania’s four pillars of fiscal decentralization 
 Putting aside the Zanzibar dilemma, we now turn to GoT’s four pillars of fiscal 
decentralization, namely the assignment of expenditure functions, the assignment of taxing 
authorities, the design of the intergovernmental grant and transfer system, and the regulation of 
the borrowing authority of sub-national governments. We also examine the current fiscal 
arrangements from the perspective of the conventional view.10 We then turn to a discussion of 
what we contend are the more fundamental challenges to fiscal decentralization in Tanzania, and 
in other countries of sub-Saharan Africa, specifically ethnic fractionalization, widespread 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Yingyi Qian and Gérard Rolland (1998) and Jonathan A. Rodden, Gunnar S. Eskeland, and 
Jennie Litvack (2003) for an introduction to the challenge of soft budget constraints in a federal system. 
10 Jameson Boex and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (2006) provide a much more detailed treatment of these topics in their 
excellent work on the intergovernmental fiscal arrangements of mainland Tanzania. 
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poverty, competition for natural resource rents, human resource capacity constraints, and weak 
or missing institutions. 
Expenditure assignments 
 The first pillar of the fiscal decentralization architecture is the assignment of expenditure 
responsibilities to the various tiers of government. As previously noted, the normative theory of 
fiscal decentralization suggests that, all other things equal, government functions should be 
assigned to the lowest level of government consistent with economies of scale and inter-
jurisdictional spillovers. To enhance responsiveness and accountability, local governments 
should be given, as far as it is practical, exclusive assignments. Finally, to prevent fiscal rent 
seeking, income redistribution should be the exclusive responsibility of the central government.11  
 In Tanzania, the Local Government Acts of 1982, as amended, provide that local 
governments are responsible for the delivery of five basic sectors: primary education, basic 
healthcare, agricultural extension and livestock services, local water supply, and local public 
works. In addition, according to these laws local governments have responsibility for land use 
planning, sanitation, and local public markets. An important feature of Tanzania’s expenditure 
assignments is that they have skipped over the intermediate level of government and assigned 
most of the responsibilities to local governments. 
 Although five specific functions are formally assigned to local government, this may not 
accord with actual practice in the field. First of all, most of these basic services are funded 
through formula-based, sectoral block grants from the central government, which come with 
specific conditions and spending restrictions. Second, the central government retains policy 
setting authority for grant funded sectors, which is the major reason for the spending restrictions 
associated with the transfers. Third, as mentioned above, the central government also plays a 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (1998) for a more complete treatment of this subject. 
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significant role in personnel decisions for delivery of these services, even at the local level. Thus 
despite the seemingly genuine desire to decentralize along with the legal language of 
decentralization, a system has emerged in Tanzania that is de facto less decentralized than might 
appear by simply reading the enabling legislation. 
 This observation does not necessarily imply that the government is at fault or that some 
alternative approaches might be better suited to achieving the ultimate goal of fiscal 
decentralization in Tanzania. It might instead be the case, as we contend below, that the obstacles 
to decentralization in Tanzania arising from fundamental characteristics of the country’s socio-
economic conditions and its political economy preclude further decentralization at this time. In 
fact, these fundamental obstacles may well preclude following the prescriptions of the normative 
theory of fiscal decentralization in countries like Tanzania, at least at this stage of their 
development.12 
 Although assigning these five functions to sub-national governments generally follows 
the practice in many other decentralized countries, these assignments do not strictly accord with 
the principles of expenditure assignments derived from the normative theory and summarized 
above. For example, agricultural extension and livestock services are likely to create significant 
inter-jurisdictional spillovers due to externalities from research and development and vaccination 
and quarantine programs. To the extent that jurisdictions do not take into account these spillover 
effects, these services may be underprovided by local governments. Local water works and 
public works entail significant economies of scale and require engineering expertise that may not 
be available or may be unaffordable to local governments. Also, one would expect that 
                                                 
12 Consider, for example, the government’s strategy (Local Government Fiscal Review 2007, pages 5-6) to use the 
PMO-RALG to review the various ministerial budgets to “… ensure that functions carried out by the line ministries 
do not encroach on the functions that are assigned to local government authorities”. This desire to give local 
government’s some degree of autonomy conflicts with the government’s “… significant concern…with respect to 
the capacity of local governments to deliver sectoral services”. 
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organizing local markets should be within the competency of the private sector. It is difficult to 
justify local governments involving themselves in establishing local public markets on the basis 
of a market failure, unless it involves property right practices in Tanzania. However, market dues 
are a major source of revenue to local governments throughout East Africa, and this may provide 
sufficient justification for assigning this function to local governments, at least at this stage of 
Tanzania’s economic development. 
 Finally, primary education and basic healthcare involve a significant element of 
redistribution, which, according to the principles of expenditure assignments, should be an 
exclusive responsibility of the central government. Moreover, since education and health care are 
often important parts of central government development policies, the central government will 
typically want to regulate and monitor local efforts in these areas. However, assigning control to 
the central level may not make sense within the broader context of the current socio-economic 
conditions of Tanzania. For example, in the case of education, particularly primary education, in 
an ethnically fragmented country like Tanzania, providing for instruction in the local tribal 
language may be an important element of a community’s identity and communal aspirations. 
Central governments may impose excessive uniformity as cost savings measures, promote 
policies aimed at creating a lingua franca at the expense of local languages and cultures, and 
may promote instruction in the native language of the dominant ethno-linguistic group.   
 Similarly, primary healthcare involves an element of redistribution and, at least in the 
case of controlling contagious diseases, inter-jurisdictional spillover effects. These two 
characteristics of primary healthcare would suggest that this service should be assigned to a 
higher level of government. In an ethically fragmented country, however, there may be greater 
intra-group than inter-group altruism. Thus it may make sense to assign these redistributive 
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functions to the local level, particularly when the main funding source for local governments is 
intergovernmental transfers. In short, assigning primary education and healthcare to the local 
level may be another union preserving feature of Tanzania’s fiscal arrangements that, strictly 
speaking, cannot be rationalized by the principles of expenditure assignments derived from the 
conventional view of the normative theory of fiscal decentralization. 
Revenue assignments 
 Public sector economists often say revenue assignments should follow expenditure 
assignments to ensure that sub-national governments have sufficient revenues to fund their 
expenditure responsibilities, at least at the margin. Generally speaking, sub-national governments 
should rely more heavily on relatively immobile tax bases, like a property tax; whereas, taxes 
with a redistributive or stabilization goal, like a progressive income tax, should be assigned to 
the central government. At a minimum, local governments should have rate setting authority 
over at least one broad-based tax in order to provide local governments with a source of marginal 
finance.13 
 Until 2003 Tanzania followed an ‘open list’ approach to local revenue sources, allowing 
local governments to design their own tax and fee structures with prohibitions only against the 
use of some major revenue sources reserved for the exclusive use of the central government. As 
Jameson Boex and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (2006) point out, this is a higher degree of local 
fiscal autonomy than is typically observed in developing economies, particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
 A high degree of local fiscal autonomy is often advocated by economists, but the 
relatively autonomous local tax system in Tanzania was viewed by government officials there as 
                                                 
13 For a fuller treatment of this topic see, for example, Richard A. Musgrave (1983) and Roy Bahl (2009) and the 
references provided therein. 
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cumbersome and inefficient. Local taxes were said to be difficult to administer; they were highly 
unpopular; compliance was low; and there was lack of coordination between the local and central 
government tax structures. In a budget speech in June 2003, the Minister of Finance began a 
major reform of local tax systems by proclaiming that a number of widely used local taxes and 
fees would no longer be allowed. Instead of those, he announced a ‘closed list’ of allowable local 
taxes and fees along with maximum allowable rates.  
 The closed list includes a building property tax, a land rent tax, sales taxes on crops, 
forest products and services, a guest-house (hotel) tax, and numerous administrative fees, fines, 
and penalties.14 In addition, in 2004 most local business license fees were disallowed as part of a 
reform to stimulate economic growth. All of these changes have since been formally 
incorporated into law through amendments to the Local Government Finances Act of 1982. 
 These changes to the local government revenue structure caused a significant drop in 
local own source revenues, falling from about 19 percent of total local resources in FY 2002-03 
to about 10 percent in FY 2004-05. To date, aggregate own source revenues continue to be about 
10 percent of local resources, with the other 90 percent consisting of central government 
transfers and grants from international donors.  
 Clearly, these revenue assignments to local governments are not adequate to finance the 
expenditure functions assigned to them. In other words, there is a vertical fiscal imbalance. The 
central government is assigned the broad-based and high revenue yielding consumption and 
income tax bases; whereas, local governments are assigned the resource intensive expenditure 
functions, such as education, health, and public works. This arrangement is very common in 
                                                 
14 The annual land tax is collected by the central government, 20 percent of which is remitted to the local 
government. 
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decentralized countries. According to the theory, local governments may overspend on public 
services when the Wicksellian link between public tax prices and public services is broken.  
 On the one hand, there are a number of sound reasons for concentrating taxing powers at 
the central level, including the need to conduct macroeconomic stabilization policy, to conduct 
the redistributive function, to provide for tax coordination, and to tax mobile tax bases. On the 
other hand, there is an old saying that he who pays the piper calls the tune, meaning that 
concentrating the taxing powers in the central government allows it to constrain the autonomy of 
local governments. In other words, making sub-national governments dependent on the central 
government for revenues and thereby constraining the autonomy of sub-national governments 
may be a another union preserving feature of Tanzania’s fiscal arrangements. A government unit 
that already enjoys substantial autonomy may feel more inclined to go it alone than a 
government that is dependent upon another. 
 To address this vertical imbalance, mainland Tanzania uses formula-based, sectoral block 
grants to finance local government services, which is the topic of the next section.  
The system of intergovernmental transfers  
 In low-income countries, like Tanzania, most public sector economists recognize that 
local governments require predictable transfers from a higher level government to finance basic 
service delivery and infrastructure investment because of the vertical financing gap that is the 
consequence of the expenditure and tax assignments, as discussed in the preceding section. 
According to the conventional wisdom, there are several roles for intergovernmental grants and 
transfers. First, intergovernmental grants can be used to correct for inter-jurisdictional spillover 
benefits and costs. Second, they can be used by the national government to pursue national 
priorities in areas that are otherwise the exclusive competency of local governments, such as 
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literacy or vaccination against contagious diseases. Finally, they can be used to fund central 
government mandates to sub-national governments. Central governments may mandate that local 
governments administer certain programs that are otherwise a central government competency 
because the local government may be able to do so more efficiently than the central 
government.15  
 In the conventional view, the intergovernmental transfer system also should provide for a 
generous unconditional transfer to give meaning to the fiscal autonomy of sub-national 
governments, to address vertical imbalances that often result from conventional tax and 
expenditure assignments in decentralized countries, and to address horizontal fiscal disparities 
among sub-national governments. The latter arise from differences in the costs of providing 
services or the size of local tax bases in some jurisdictions as a result of differences in local 
conditions, such as topography, climate, and so on. It is worth noting, however, that the 
advantages (disadvantages) possessed by some sub-national governments may reflect the 
historical practice of one ethnic group directing national resources to its benefit and to the 
disadvantage of other ethnic groups. A history of such practices often gives rise to a sense of 
ethnic grievance that is the fuel of civil wars and separatist movements in many parts of the 
world. In any event, we now turn to a description and assessment of Tanzania’s formula-based, 
sectoral block grants.  
 Table 2 summarizes Tanzania’s system of formula-based, recurrent, sectoral block grants 
and their respective allocation formulas. There is a single block grant for each of the five 
functions assigned to local governments. This system is formula-based which makes the 
allocations more predictable and less susceptible to political manipulation than ad hoc or 
                                                 
15 For a more complete treatment of the theory and practice of intergovernmental grant design, see Anwar Shah and 
Zia Qureshi (1994), Ehtisham Ahmad (1997), Jun Ma (1997), Richard M. Bird and Michael Smart (2001), and 
Jameson Boex and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (2003). 
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negotiated transfers. While an unconditional, equalization grant scheme, like that in Germany, 
India, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and the Russian Federation to name just a few, would 
give local governments greater expenditure autonomy, Tanzania decided to rely on a sectorally 
based transfer system. The advantage of this approach is that it gives the central government 
greater control over the use of funds by local governments. For example, it assures that funds are 
used for national priorities such as primary education and health care. Block grants also may 
make it easier for the central government to monitor the use of funds and to prevent waste, fraud, 
and abuse by local governments. The obvious disadvantage is that this arrangement decreases the 
autonomy of local governments to establish budget priorities.  
 Finally, transfers constitute nearly 90 percent of local government revenues, and the 
allocation formulas have equalizing features. Having transfer dependent local governments 
decreases the incentive for local governments to develop the administrative capacity to raise their 
own revenues and may inhibit the development of robust financial management systems. Absent 
these institutions, the ability of local governments to secede from the country is more difficult. 
Similarly, equalizing expenditures may help to mitigate ethnic competition that can lead to civil 
wars and secessionist movements. 
Regulation of sub-national borrowing autonomy 
 Ideally, sub-national governments should have some perhaps limited autonomy to borrow 
in order to finance capital expenditures. This allows local governments to smooth expenditures 
over time when making ‘lumpy’ public investments and also increases intergenerational equity 
by financing long-lived assets over several generations. In addition, the ability to borrow from 
the market creates incentives for local governments to be fiscally disciplined in order to improve 
their credit rating and thereby lower the interest rate at which they can borrow. On the other 
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hand, sub-national borrowing creates risks as well. As previously noted, providing sub-national 
governments with unfettered borrowing autonomy combined with the inability of a central 
government to make a credible commitment to a no bailout policy creates a soft budget 
constraint for sub-national governments. A soft budget constraint can give rise to a lack of fiscal 
discipline among sub-national governments which can eventually lead to fiscal instability and 
ultimately macroeconomic and political instability. Therefore, public sector economists generally 
advocate constraining in some way the borrowing autonomy of sub-national governments. 
 Regarding the borrowing autonomy of sub-national governments, there are two further 
issues facing the country. Tanzania currently lacks deep, private capital markets required to 
support market borrowing by sub-national governments. Second, as previously noted, local 
governments are heavily transfer dependent and thus lack a reliable and independent source of 
revenue that can be used to service their debt obligations.16 Since local governments receive an 
overwhelming majority of their revenues from transfers, the central government could be seen as 
implicitly guaranteeing the debt of local governments. Perhaps for these reasons, the Local 
Government Finances Act of 1982 established the Local Government Loan Board (LGLB) which 
is a government-supported financial intermediary for LGAs. According to Jameson Boex and 
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (2006), the weaknesses of the LGLB are the following: the Board’s 
capitalization is inadequate; it exercises significant discretion in selecting local projects to be 
funded; and the current lending mechanism is substantially biased against wealthier urban areas. 
4.  Fundamental socio-economic challenges to fiscal decentralization in Tanzania 
 In the previous section, we described the main features of Tanzania’s system of fiscal 
decentralization and identified some of the obstacles to decentralization from the perspective of 
                                                 
16 Dana Weist (2004) discusses the importance of integrating capital financing systems (i.e., intergovernmental 
loans) with intergovernmental transfer systems. 
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principles derived from the normative theory of fiscal decentralization. We also pointed out that 
some of the seemingly ill-conceived features of Tanzania’s intergovernmental fiscal framework 
may make sense from the perspective of union preserving federalism. We are now ready to turn 
to a discussion of the challenges to federalism posed by ethnic fractionalization, widespread 
poverty, competition for natural resource rents, human resource capacity constraints, and weak 
and missing institutions. We believe that these are the fundamental challenges to fiscal 
decentralization not only in Tanzania but in many other countries of sub-Saharan Africa, as well.  
 Paul Collier (2000, 2001, and 2007) makes the case that the combination of a dominant 
ethnic group, as opposed to simply ethnic fractionalization, weak institutions, particularly non-
democratic or authoritarian rule, a high rate of poverty, and an abundance of natural resources 
are a toxic brew that significantly increases the probability that a country will experience civil 
war. Revenues from oil help finance guerillas and poverty reduces the opportunity cost of 
becoming a guerillas fighter. The challenge for the countries of sub-Saharan Africa is to develop 
indigenous institutions that allow them to moderate the civil strife that may result from these 
socio-economic conditions. We try to make the case that properly conceived and implemented 
union preserving federalism is a potentially important means of achieving the goal of greater 
national cohesion in Tanzania and elsewhere.17 We begin with a discussion of the challenge of 
ethnic fractionalization. 
Ethnic fractionalization 
                                                 
17 According to Wallace E Oates (1972), political scientists recognize countries as being federal only in the limited 
number of cases in which different levels of government each possess an explicitly independent scope of 
responsibility and authority. Typically, these are constitutional provisions. We do not adopt this legalistic approach 
to the definition of federalism. For our purposes, we prefer the economic definition of federalism proposed by 
Wallace E. Oates (1972, page 17): a federal government is characterized by “[a] public sector with both centralized 
and decentralized levels of decision-making in which choices [are] made at each level concerning the provision of 
public services ….” 
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 In the popular mind, countries with a high degree of ethnic fractionalization seem to 
suffer from a proclivity for violence and government failure. In an influential article, James D. 
Fearon and David D. Laitin (2003) find that the countries at greatest risk for civil war are not 
those with a high degree of ethnic or religious fractionalization but rather the presence of 
conditions that favor insurgency. These include the rate of poverty and being an oil exporter. 
Alberto Alesina, Reza Baquir, and William Easterly (1999) provide evidence that racially diverse 
local jurisdictions in the United States spend less on local public services, everything else equal, 
than more homogeneous jurisdictions. Alberto Alesina and Elian La Ferrara (2000) find that 
there is less participation in social activities in racially diverse communities in the United States 
than in more homogeneous ones. These findings suggest that ethnically diverse countries or 
entities, combined with other factors such as the presence of natural resource rents, may make it 
difficult for the people to come together to pursue common goals. 
 As table 5 shows, Tanzania is the most ethnically fractionalized country in Africa. In fact, 
according to the authoritative study by James D. Fearon (2003), Papua New Guinea is the only 
country in the world that is more ethnically fractionalized than Tanzania.18 Table 5 also provides 
a ranking based on an index of cultural diversity, which tries to capture the cultural ‘distance’ 
between ethnic groups. Although Tanzania is not the most culturally diverse country in Africa – 
it ranks 14th according to this index – it stills ranks quite high in Africa and in the world. 
 Based on this evidence, Tanzania would seem to be at risk of ethnic conflict, low 
provision of public goods, and potentially government failure. On a more hopeful note, Paul 
Collier (2000, 2001) reports evidence that democratic institutions can help moderate ethnic 
tensions in ethnically fragmented countries. He finds that diversity is damaging to economic 
                                                 
18 We use the most commonly employed measure of aggregated ethnic fractionalization, defined as the probability 
that two individuals selected at random from a country will be from different ethnic groups. James Fearon (2003) 
provides further details on the properties of this measure and the data used to construct the ranking in table 5.  
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performance in the context of limited political rights. But, diversity has no effect on economic 
growth in the presence of democratic institutions. Thus, he provides some preliminary evidence 
that the challenge for Tanzania and other sub-Saharan countries is to develop democratic 
institutions that help to moderate ethnic competition. One of these democratic institutions in 
many cases may be some form of union preserving federalism that provides for cooperation to 
pursue common goals and autonomy to pursue communal or tribal goals.19 
Widespread poverty 
 As table 2 shows the poverty rate in mainland Tanzania is 35.7 percent, and varies 
between 17.6 percent in Dar es Salaam at the low end and 55 percent in Singida at the high end. 
It perhaps goes without saying that widespread poverty is an impediment to fiscal 
decentralization, but it is worthwhile to take explicit account of how extreme poverty, of the type 
experienced in Tanzania and many other countries of sub-Saharan Africa, affects the capacity of 
local governments to provide services. At the same time, it is evident that widespread and 
extreme poverty is possibly the main reason for an urgent push to improve local government 
institutions and service delivery in many countries. Ironically, poverty may be both an obstacle 
to effective decentralization and its raison d’être. 
 As previously noted, Tanzania’s per capita GDP was about $750 in purchasing power 
parity terms in 2005. The United Nations Human Development Index ranks Tanzania at 159 out 
of 177 countries. These data mean, for example, that about 30 percent of the adult population is 
not literate, that life expectancy is 51 years, that 80 percent of the labor force is employed in 
                                                 
19 Tanzania has avoided the extreme consequences of the potentially combustible combination of fiscal 
fragmentation, widespread poverty, and weak or missing institutions, which the world has witnessed in Uganda and 
more recently in the Congo. According to Edward Miguel (2004, page 331), Tanzania avoided these extreme 
manifestations of ethnic fragmentation as a result of the wise leadership of Tanzania’s first, post-colonial leader, 
President Julius Neyerere, who “… forcefully downplayed the role of ethnic affiliation in public life and instead 
emphasized a single Tanzanian national identity”. 
23 
 
subsistence agriculture, and that almost 90 percent of the population is living on less than $2 per 
day. 
 Against this backdrop, it should be noted that annual compensation of the average LGA 
employee - $2,080 (measured at the official exchange rate) in year 2007 - is about five times the 
country’s GDP per capita. This is an important fact that makes public service delivery in low 
income countries different from public service delivery in high income countries. The 
opportunity cost of a unit of local public services is significantly higher in terms of the amount of 
private sector services foregone in a low income country than in a developed country. 20 Thus 
perhaps one should be cautious in recommending increased service delivery through the public 
sector in such circumstances. This is especially important in Tanzania where donor funds are a 
significant share of the government’s budget and may be luring productive resources out of the 
private sector with adverse consequences for economic and human development. 
 As previously discussed, one of the pillars of fiscal decentralization is local government 
revenue autonomy.  A lack of revenue autonomy at the local level is, according to the 
conventional view, a sign of a poorly designed fiscal framework for decentralization. Table 6 
shows the aggregate revenues raised by local governments by type of tax and the share of each 
tax in local government own revenues for FY 2006-07. Indeed, when one looks at the structure 
of Tanzania’s tax system, it appears to provide for some level of local revenue autonomy, but 
there is in fact effectively very little revenue autonomy at the local level. As previously noted, in 
FY 2006-07 central government grants to local governments accounted for over 90 percent of 
local government revenues. Thus, the flow of revenues to local governments from central 
government grants overwhelms the amount collected by local governments from own sources. 
                                                 
20 In contrast, the average weekly earnings in the goods producing industries in Canada was $998.61 in 2007 
Canadian dollars; whereas, the average weekly earnings in local, municipal, and regional public administration is 
$856.34 or approximately 86 percent of the average weekly earnings in the private sector. 
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This evidence would seem to imply that more tax revenue needs to be generated by local 
governments; either by more effective use of current local tax instruments or by allowing the use 
of new taxes, but this conclusion would be mistaken. 
 The problem is that the rural areas, where most of the people live, are so poor that the tax 
base in most areas is inadequate to generate sufficient revenue for local governments to finance 
public services from own source revenues. High levels of poverty and underdevelopment usually 
imply that agriculture plays a large role in the economy. Table 7 shows the shares of GDP 
generated by agriculture, industry, and services in Tanzania. Agriculture makes up 45 percent of 
Tanzania’s GDP and employs 80 percent of the work force. If one also imagines that 80 percent 
of the population is supported by agriculture, then some relatively simple calculations suggest 
that per capita GDP in the agricultural sector is about $202. This sum clearly leaves a large 
fraction of the population on the edge of subsistence.  
 Agriculture is notoriously difficult to tax, but even if it were not, there is little or nothing 
for the government to tax. The surplus from subsistence agriculture is too small for any 
government, local or central, to seek financing from this sector. If 40 percent of GDP is 
effectively untaxable, then government revenue must be generated from elsewhere. Figure 3 
shows the sources of domestic revenue flowing to the central government for FY 2003-04. The 
central government’s tax structure is fairly conventional, consisting of a number of taxes, 
including a value-added tax (VAT), an income taxes, a payroll tax (PAYE), import duties, and 
special excise taxes. Tanzania does not produce oil domestically; therefore, the excise tax and 
VAT on petroleum are basically equivalent to import duties. In fact, a large share of the general 
VAT itself is probably collected at the border, and the same is likely to be true for a large share 
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of excise tax receipts. Adding the shares in figure 3 together suggests that about 60 percent of 
central government revenue is more than likely collected at the border.21 
 Looking at the revenue performance of the central government by region seems to 
confirm this view. Figure 4 provides the shares of central government tax revenue collections by 
region. It shows that the capital city, Dar es Salaam, generates 82 percent of the tax revenue; 
other regions contribute the remaining 18 percent of revenue to the central government, and the 
next largest revenue provider, aside from the capital city, generates only 3 percent. 
 These facts obviously help explain the transfer dependency of local governments in 
Tanzania. The lack of own source revenues is due to the lack of local tax bases in rural areas 
rather than a flaw in the assignment of taxing authority to the various tiers of government.22 The 
crux of the matter is that widespread poverty increases expenditure needs and decreases the 
ability of local government to finance these needs. As a result, people’s desires to meet their 
basic needs for merit goods, such as drinking water, healthcare, and education, may not be 
satisfied due to the lack of taxable economic activity. Unmet expectations among a large, 
impoverished, and ethnically fragmented population may boil over into political instability and 
civil conflict, particularly if there are significant amounts of wealth available to be plundered 
from natural resources.  
Competition for natural resource rents 
 Although Tanzania is not ‘burdened’ with a bounty of natural resources, many sub-
Saharan countries do have an abundance of natural resources, including natural gas, oil, precious 
                                                 
21 A fundamental principle of optimal taxation, however, is that taxes should apply to as wide a tax base as possible 
in order to keep marginal tax rates as small as possible. Narrowing the tax base requires an increase in the tax rate 
for any given amount of revenue, and damage to the economy is known to increase with the square of the marginal 
tax rate.  In poor countries like Tanzania, where large sectors of the economy are effectively untaxable, tax rates on 
the remaining sectors need to be relatively high in order to raise a given amount of revenue; thus increasing the 
deadweight loss of raising a given level of revenue.  
22 For a detailed discussion of the challenges posed by providing public services in remote areas, see Harry Kitchen 
and Enid Slack (2006). 
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metals, and gemstones. As previously noted, the combination of ethnic fractionalization, 
widespread poverty, and competition for natural resource rents in the context of weak and 
missing institutions can be a highly combustible mix. 
 According to the normative theory of fiscal decentralization, the authority to tax natural 
resources should be assigned to the central government. If the taxing authority is assigned to sub-
national governments, the uneven distribution of resources throughout the country will lead to 
fiscal disparities among sub-national jurisdictions. Furthermore, such an assignment of taxing 
authority may enable resource-rich jurisdictions to finance government services with little or no 
taxes. This, in turn, may lead to inefficient migration from resource-poor jurisdictions which 
must use taxes to finance government services to resource-rich jurisdictions.23 Thus, according to 
the conventional wisdom, the authority to tax the rents from exhaustible resources should be 
assigned to the central government for equity and efficiency reasons.  
 Charles E. McClure (1994, page 312) points out that the equity argument for centralized 
taxation of natural resources raises a fundamental concern of federalism. He says, “[t]he issue 
can be summarized simply: who are ‘we’ and who are ‘they’?” In other words, if people’s 
primary loyalties are to their country, rather than their ethnic group, then assignment of revenues 
from natural resources primarily to the central government presumably makes more sense. If, on 
the other hand, people’s primary loyalties are to their ethnic group, then primary assignment to 
sub-national governments may be more appealing. As previously noted, the national identity of 
                                                 
23 See, for example Kenneth J. McKenzie (2006) for a discussion of the issues surrounding the taxation of economic 
rents from exhaustible resources. He notes two exceptions or caveats to the conventional wisdom that the central 
government should be assigned the authority to tax the rents from exhaustible resources. First, there are externalities 
and infrastructure needs associated with resource extraction. These costs may call for a perhaps limited role for 
regional governments to tax exhaustible resources as compensation. Second, resource-rich regions may need to be 
permitted to maintain a significant share of the rents generated from natural resources within their boundaries in 
order to remain part of the federation. This observation is particularly pertinent in the context of countries with weak 
nation identities and weak or missing institutions. Despite the conventional wisdom, many, if not most, federal 
countries allow regional governments to take a sizable share of the economic rents from resources extracted from 
within their boundaries. 
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many sub-Saharan African countries is weak which may suggest that assigning a sizable share of 
the revenues from natural resources to the producing regions may be union preserving and thus 
desirable.24 
 In the context of an ethnically fragmented country, assigning the revenues from natural 
resources to a central government dominated by a rival ethnic group to the ones in the resource-
rich regions may give rise to suspicions and tensions about the way in which these monies are 
being spent, whatever the reality of the situation. Moreover, environmental damage and 
infrastructure needs are associated with resource extraction. Again, a central government 
dominated by a rival ethnic group may be perceived, whatever the reality of the situation, as 
paying insufficient concern to the local environment that is the ancestral home of another tribe or 
group. Nigeria and Sudan are clear examples of countries in which these dynamics are at play: 
ethnic tensions are high and bordering on open revolt. 
 From the perspective of union preserving federalism, the simple prescription that the 
taxation of resources should be assigned to the central government may not be tenable. Some 
federal countries, Australia, Canada, and the United States being prominent examples, allow 
regional governments to tax natural resource extraction occurring within their territory. Another 
arrangement is to provide for asymmetric treatment of such regions in the federal system. This 
arrangement appears to be particularly attractive to countries with active separatist movements in 
regions with an abundance of natural resources. The Russian Federation in the case of Tartarstan 
                                                 
24 As it may have been in Australia, Canada, and the United States. Interestingly, these three mature federal 
countries assign the revenues from natural resources to sub-national governments. This is particularly ironic because 
the conventional wisdom of fiscal decentralization is largely based on the work of students of federalism from these 
three countries. Charles E. McClure (1994) provides two possible explanations for this arrangement in these three 
countries. At the time that these federations were being formed the value of these resources could not be anticipated, 
and at that time the primary loyalty of the citizens of these countries may have been with their state or province 
rather than their country. So, these three successful federations may provide a precedent for idea that countries with 
weak national identities may prefer to assign primary responsibility for taxing natural resource to sub-national 
governments, despite the conventional wisdom.  
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and Indonesia in the case of Ache are examples of countries that provide for asymmetric 
treatment to resource-rich regions threatening secession. Clearly, this challenge to successful 
fiscal decentralization deserves greater attention from fiscal economists. 
Human resource capacity constraints 
 Many low income countries have shortages of people with the training and professional 
skills to staff local government offices; this is particularly true in rural areas of low income 
countries. Human resource capacity constraints are exacerbated by the fact that the central 
government and often donors are competing for these same skill sets in a relatively shallow labor 
pool. This resource constraint is no doubt reflected in the high wages paid by the government 
sector, as previously noted. Human resource capacity constraints reflect widespread poverty 
which results in a lack of access to education. The lack of qualified individuals to staff local 
government offices also contributes to weak and missing institutions.  
For example, the PMO-RALG claims to have serious concerns about the capacity of local 
governments to manage the delivery and financing of important local services. To underscore 
this concern, the government decided in June 2007 (Local Government Fiscal Review 2007, page 
11) to require the Tanzanian Revenue Authority to assist the LGA’s in the collection of local 
property taxes. The lack of true local government autonomy, however, is perhaps most clearly 
revealed by the following statement also in the Local Government Fiscal Review 2007 (page 11):  
Finally, it should be noted that despite the advances in fiscal decentralization made in 
Tanzania over time, local governments in reality have only limited expenditure 
autonomy. Most importantly, local governments continue to have only very limited 
control over local personnel decisions, as the approval of local government posts 
continues to be controlled centrally… . 
 
 In Tanzania, the central government recruits and employs local government employees. 
While this may help address the lack of qualified people to staff local government offices in the 
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short-run, this is clearly a serious constraint on the autonomy of local governments. In short, a 
decentralization strategy should include a plan to address the lack of qualified professionals to 
staff local government offices, particularly in rural areas. This is another issue that deserves 
greater attention from fiscal economists. 
Weak and missing institutions  
 As one considers modern systems of decentralized governments, one cannot help but be 
impressed by their success and efficiencies. Nevertheless, even a casual glance across the 
political landscape of most modern economies will reveal that political corruption has a 
noteworthy presence. At any given moment in the United States, for example, one is likely to 
find one or more of the nation’s former governors in jail, and every year dozens of mayors, 
council members, and other political figures are indicted, prosecuted, and convicted of public 
wrongdoing. Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon, and the scourge of government corruption 
is unlikely to have bypassed Tanzania. In fact, Transparency International ranks Tanzania 94 out 
of 179 countries, with a ranking of 1 being the least corrupt and a ranking of 179 being the most 
corrupt country. 
 We contend, however, that corruption is a symptom of weak and missing institutions 
rather than the cause of government failure. Undoubtedly, there is feedback between the two, 
where official corruption leads to government failure, and government failure breeds corruption.   
Be that as it may, honest, effective, and efficient governance requires robust and, we would 
argue, redundant accountability mechanisms. In democratic countries, accountability 
mechanisms include ’voice’ or free and fair voting in competitive elections, civil society 
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organizations, a free and independent press, an independent judiciary, and so on. Many of these 
institutions are missing in Tanzania and in many of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.25  
 In a federal system, a mobile population willing and able to move among competing 
jurisdictions is an important accountability mechanism, as implied by Charles M. Tiebout’s 
(1956) famous phrase ‘voting with your feet’. In Tanzania, however, the population is relatively 
immobile due to local kinship ties and ethnic fragmentation of the population. In fact, Edward 
Miguel (2004) contends that land demarcation and individual land registration during the post-
colonial period stopped the mobility of traditional African society. The resulting lack of 
mobility, rather than being a challenge to Tanzania’s decentralization strategy, prevents one 
ethnic group from encroaching on the land of others and thus eliminates a principle source of 
inter-tribal wars.26 The point being that the lack of mobility often observed in ethnically 
fragmented and traditional societies means that ‘voting with your feet’ is not an effective 
accountability mechanism for local governments in such countries. 
 When redundant accountability mechanisms are weak or missing, then fiscal 
decentralization, like a market economy, is likely to fail to deliver more responsive, accountable, 
and efficient government. Voting, important as it is for good governance, is not sufficient, and 
promoting greater mobility of the population among competing jurisdictions is likely to lead to 
greater ethnic tension rather than increased allocative efficiency. Therefore, fiscal 
decentralization experts should give greater attention to developing effective accountability 
mechanisms in environments in which there are sound reasons why accountability mechanisms 
                                                 
25 For an excellent introduction to missing institutions in sub-Saharan Africa, see Marcel Fafchamps (2004). 
26 Another accountability mechanism in mature federal systems in the developed world, which are missing in 
Tanzania, is robust financial markets that efficiently price debt and punish irresponsible fiscal behavior by sub-
national governments that borrow from the market. 
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that may work in the United States and other developed countries, like mobility, may not work in 
different socio-economic environments.       
5. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have described the main features of Tanzania’s fiscal system and 
assessed it from the perspective of the normative theory of fiscal decentralization. In 
addition, we have tried to point out instances in which we believe that seemingly ill 
conceived fiscal arrangements from the perspective of the conventional wisdom may be 
understandable from the perspective of what we are calling union preserving federalism. 
Examples include the fiscal autonomy of GoZ; the vertical imbalance created by the 
expenditure and tax assignments; and the assignment of some redistributive functions to 
local governments. We believe that these features of Tanzania’s fiscal arrangements are 
examples of union preserving federalism in Tanzania.  
 We are not the first to point out that fiscal decentralization may play a constructive role in 
fragmented societies. On the contrary, Richard M. Bird and Thomas Stauffer (2001) and Richard 
M. Bird and Robert D. Ebel (2007) are two excellent collections of case studies on fiscal 
arrangements in fragmented countries. Our contribution to this discussion is to argue for making 
union preserving federalism an explicit and fundamental goal in designing fiscal arrangements 
rather than an afterthought. 
 While policy-makers and their technical advisors rightly pay attention to the incentives 
for allocative efficiency created by a country’s fiscal arrangements, they should also be mindful 
of the incentives that the fiscal system creates for national cohesion. Richard M. Bird and Robert 
D. Ebel (2007, page 10), leading experts on fiscal decentralization, provide a succinct statement 
of the conventional wisdom derived from the normative theory:    
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“ … providing clear expenditure assignments, giving responsibility for 
determining the rates for some major revenues to sub-national governments, and 
distributing transfers by means of a predetermined formula. …[A]n 
intergovernmental fiscal regime set up along these lines in effect imposes a hard 
budget constraint on subnational governments, and hence provides an 
appropriate incentive structure for ensuring economically efficient outcomes.” 
 
Although this statement undoubtedly oversimplifies for dramatic effect, we believe that it 
reveals the approach that many take to the challenge of designing an intergovernmental 
fiscal system. It expresses the widely shared view, particularly among economists, that the 
goal of fiscal decentralization is to achieve allocative efficiency in the public sector, almost 
to the exclusion of recognizing any other legitimate goal for decentralization, such as 
national cohesion.27  
 Also implicit in this statement is the notion that by adhering to a few simple 
principles in the design of an intergovernmental fiscal system, a country can create “an 
appropriate incentive structure for ensuring economically efficient outcomes”.28 There are 
important goals for fiscal decentralization. In addition to creating incentives to increase the 
allocative efficiency of the public sector, one such goal is to create a fiscal framework that 
allows diverse peoples with diverse interests to cooperate to achieve common goals while 
simultaneously providing them with sufficient and effective local autonomy to pursue 
communal goals. We believe that decentralization policy-making will improve if the twin 
goals of allocative efficiency and national cohesion are made explicit, and the trade-offs 
between the two are thoughtfully investigated by theorists, empiricists, and practitioners.  
                                                 
27 Perhaps this focus on the goal of achieving allocative efficiency in the public sector reflects a division of 
labor in which economists opine on the necessary conditions for allocative efficiency, while others worry 
about developing institutions to achieve national cohesion. The problem with this arrangement is that there is 
no bright line between institutions promoting allocative efficiency and those promoting national cohesion. 
Indeed, there are likely to be trade-offs between the two.  
 
28 In a similar spirit, Paul Smoke (2003, page 7) makes the point that much of the promised benefits of fiscal 
decentralization is not based in careful empirical evidence but is all too often “… based on anecdotal instances of 
success or enthusiastic rhetoric about its benefits”. 
33 
 
References 
Ahmad, Ehtisham, ed. (1997). Financing Decentralized Expenditures: An International 
Comparison of Grants. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
 
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly (1999). “Public goods and ethnic divisions”. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(4): 1243-84. 
 
Alesina, Alberto and Eliana La Ferrara (2000). Participation in heterogeneous communities”. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3): 847-904. 
 
Bahl, Roy (1999). “Implementation rules for fiscal decentralization”. International Studies 
Program working paper no. 99-01. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State 
University, Atlanta, GA. http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/files/ispwp9901.pdf 
 
Bahl, Roy (2000). “How to design a fiscal decentralization program”, in S. Yusuf, W. Wu and S. 
Evenett (eds), Local Dynamics in an Era of Globalization, New York: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 41-100. 
 
Bahl, Roy (2009). “Financing subnational governments with decentralized taxes”. International 
Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. Paper 
prepared for the Symposium on Tax Systems: Whence and Whither, Malaga, Spain. 
 
Bird, Richard M. and Michael Smart (2001). “Intergovernmental fiscal transfers: some lessons 
from international experience”. International Tax Program, Rotman School of Management, 
University of Toronto. Paper prepared for the Symposium on Intergovernmental Transfers in 
Asian Countries: Issues and Practices, Asian Tax and Public Policy Program, Hitosubashi 
University, Tokyo, Japan. 
 
Bird, Richard M. and Robert D. Ebel, eds. (2007). Fiscal Fragmentation in Decentralized 
Countries: Subsidiarity, Solidarity, and Asymmetry. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Inc. 
 
Bird, Richard and Thomas Stauffer, eds. (2001). Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in 
Fragmented Societies. Munich: Helbing & Lichtenhahn. 
 
Boex, Jameson (2003). The incidence of local government allocations in Tanzania. International 
Studies Program working paper 03-11. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State 
University, Atlanta, GA. http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/files/ispwp0311.pdf 
 
Boex, Jameson and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (2003). “Local government reform in Tanzania: 
considerations for the development of a system of formula-based grants”. International Studies 
Program, working paper 03-05, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State 
University, Atlanta, GA. http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/files/ispwp0305.pdf 
 
34 
 
Boex, Jameson and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (2006). Local Government Finance Reform in 
Developing Countries: The Case of Tanzania. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
Cameron, Greg (2002). “Zanzibar’s turbulent transition”. Review of African Political Economy 
29(92), Africa, The African Diaspora and Development: 313-30. 
 
CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
 
Collier, Paul (2000). “Ethnicity, politics and economic performance”. Economics and Politics 
12(3): 225-45. 
 
Collier, Paul (2001). “Ethnic diversity”. Economic Policy 32: 129-66. 
 
Collier, Paul (2007). The Bottom Billion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Fafchamps, Marcel (2004). Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Theory and Evidence. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
Fearon, James D. (2003). “Ethnic and cultural diversity by country”. Journal of Economic 
Growth 8: 195-222. 
 
Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (1996). “Explaining interethnic cooperation”. American 
Political Science Review 90(4): 715-33. 
 
Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (2003). “Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war”. American 
Political Science Review 97(1); 75-90. 
 
Joint Finance Commission (2006). “Study on intergovernmental fiscal relations between the 
United Republic of Tanzania and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar”. Unpublished 
manuscript. 
 
Kitchen, Harry and Enid Slack (2006). “Providing public services in remote areas”. In Richard 
M. Bird and François Vaillancourt, eds., Perspectives on Fiscal Federalism. Washington, DC: 
The World Bank. 
   
Local Government Fiscal Review 2007, “Measuring Progress on Decentralization by 
Devolution.” Prime Minister’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government, United 
Republic of Tanzania.     
 
Ma, Jun (1997). Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: A Comparison of Nine Countries. 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
 
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge (1998). “The assignment of expenditure responsibilities”. Andrew 
Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA. 
 
McClure, Charles E., ed. (1983). Tax Assignment in Federal Countries. Canberra, Australia: 
Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, Australia National University. 
35 
 
 
McClure, Charles E. (1994). “The taxation of natural resources and the future of the Russian 
Federation”. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 12: 309-318. 
 
McLure, Charles E. (1995). “The dangers of decentralization: Comment”. The World Bank 
Observer 10(2): 221-26. 
 
McKenzie, Kenneth J. (2006). “Fiscal federalism and the taxation of nonrenewable resources”. 
In Richard M. Bird and François Vaillancourt, eds., Perspectives on Fiscal Federalism. 
Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 
Miguel, Edward (2004). “Tribe or nation? Nation building and public goods in Kenya versus 
Tanzania”. World Politics 56: 327-62. 
 
Musgrave, Richard A. (1983). “Who should tax, where and what?” In Charles E. McClure, ed., 
Tax Assignment in Federal Countries. Canberra: Centre for research on Federal Financial 
Relations, Australian National University, pp. 2-19. 
 
Oates, Wallace E. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc. 
 
Prud’homme, Rémy (1995). “The dangers of decentralization”. The World Bank Observer 10(2): 
201-20. 
 
Rodden, Jonathan A., Gunnar S. Eskeland, and Jennie Litvack, eds. (2003). Fiscal 
Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints. Boston, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
Sewell, David O. (1996). “’The dangers of decentralization’ according to Prud’homme: Some 
Further Aspects”. The World Bank Observer 11(1): 143-50. 
 
Shah, Anwar and Zia Qureshi (1994). “Intergovernmental fiscal relations in Indonesia”. World 
Bank Discussion Paper 239. The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
 
Smoke, Paul (2003). “Decentralization in Africa: goals, dimensions, myths and challenges”. 
Public Administration and Development 23: 7-16. 
 
Tanzi, Vito (2001). “Pitalls on the road to fiscal decentralization”. Global Policy Program, 
working paper no. 19. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
 
Tiebout, Charles M. (1956). “A pure theory of local expenditure”. Journal of Political Economy 
64(5): 416-24. 
 
Qian, Yingyi and Gérard Roland (1998). “Federalism and the soft budget constraint”. The 
American Economic Review 88(5): 1143-62. 
 
36 
 
Weist, Dana (2004). “Intergovernmental loans: their fit into a transfer system”. International 
Studies Program working paper no. 04-22. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia 
State University, Atlanta, GA. http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/files/ispwp0422.pdf
37 
 
Figure 1: A map of the Republic of Tanzania 
 
  Source: MapsofWorld.com 
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Figure 2: Organizational chart of the Prime Minister’s Office  
of Regional Administration and Local Government 
 
Source: http://www.pmoralg.go.tz/about_us/organizaton_structure.php 
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   Figure 3: Revenues shares, fiscal year 2003-04 
Source: Ministry of Finance (http://www.mof.go.tz) 
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Figure 4: Revenue performance by regions, fiscal year 2003-04 
 
  Source: Ministry of Finance (http://www.mof.go.tz) 
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Table 1: Demographic profile of the United Republic of Tanzania, by region 
 
Mainland 
Land area
in sq. km. 
(‘000)
Population
2008
(‘000)
Population 
density per 
sq. km.  
(2008) 
Rate of 
urbanization
(percent)
Dodoma  41 2,005 49 12.6
Arusha     36 1,570 44 31.3
Kilimanjaro     13 1,569 121 20.9
Tanga  27 1,880 70 18.4
Morogoro  71 2,022 28 27.0
Pwani  33 1,015 31 21.1
Dar es Salaam  1 2,961 2,961 93.9
Lindi  66 887 13 16.0
Mtwara  17 1,272 75 20.3
Ruvuma  64 1,303 20 15.2
Iringa  57 1,680 29 17.2
Mbeya  60 2,502 42 20.4
Singida  49 1,295 26 13.7
Tabora  76 2,171 29 12.9
Rukwa  69 1,399 20 17.6
Kigoma  37 1,669 45 12.1
Shinyanga  51 3,549 70 9.2
Kagera  29 2,380 82 6.2
Mwanza  20 3,364 168 20.2
Mara  22 1,692 77 18.6
Manyara  46 1,288 28 13.6
Total-Tanzania 885 39,475 45 22.6
Coefficient of variation 50.5 38.7 331.4 
Zanzibar  (sq. km) (’000) (sq. km) (percent)
Kaskazini Unguja   470 166 352 1.7
Kusini Unguja  854 108 125 5.2
Mjini Magharibi 230 460 1,998 81.9
Kaskazini Pemba 574 234 408 16.5
Kusini Pemba  332 226 681 17.9
Total-Zanzibar 2,460 1,193 485 39.6
Coefficient of variation 49.0 56.0 408.0 133.0
Total-Tanzania  887,460 40,668 46 na
 
Source:  Tanzania in figures (http://www.nbs.go.tz/TZ_FIGURES/TZ_FIG_2008.pdf). 
Note: Population figures do not include refugees. 
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Table 2: Socio-economic profile of the United Republic of Tanzania, by regions 
 
Mainland Tanzania 
GRDP per 
capita in 2005
at current 
prices
(Shs. billion)1 
Adult literacy 
rate
(percent)2 
Infant 
mortality rate 
(per 1,000 
live births)3 
Poverty rate 
(percent)2 
Rate 
HIV-Positive
(percent)4 
Dodoma  219.9 66 114 34 1.4
Arusha     414.8 78 41 39 8.9
Kilimanjaro     445.8 85 46 31 3.3
Tanga  439.5 67 98 36 14.7
Morogoro  375.5 72 100 29 3.4
Pwani  269.0 61 101 46 0.9
Dar es Salaam  700.7 91 79 17.6 1.9
Lindi  315.3 58 129 53 3.9
Mtwara  278.0 68 126 38 1.7
Ruvuma  447.2 84 104 41 5.3
Iringa  456.9 81 102 29 7.9
Mbeya  422.1 79 101 21 4.2
Singida  208.2 71 82 55 5.0
Tabora  297.0 65 83 26 3.0
Rukwa  357.8 68 106 31 5.3
Kigoma  220.2 71 92 38 7.6
Shinyanga  243.4 55 92 42 2.6
Kagera  238.6 64 110 29 6.1
Mwanza  344.8 65 87 48 3.8
Mara  359.3 76 113 46 4.5
Manyara  384.2 na na na 5.4
Total-Tanzania 360.9 71 99 35.7 5.8
Coefficient of variation 32.5 13.3 23.3 27.6 64.9
Zanzibar Tanzania  
Kaskazini Unguja   na na 103 na na
Kusini Unguja  na na 87 na na
Mjini Magharibi na na 70 na na
Kaskazini Pemba na na 101 na na
Kusini Pemba  na na na na na
Total-Zanzibar na na na na na
Coefficient of variation na na na na na
Total -Tanzania  na na na na na
 
Source: 1National Bureau of Statistics (http://www.nbs.go.tz/nationalaccount/index.htm). 
2National Bureau of Statistics, Household Budget Survey,    (http://www.tsed.org/home.aspx). 
3National Bureau of Statistics, Population and Housing Census, 2002. 
(http://www.tsed.org/home.aspx). 
4 Tanzania in Figures 2008 (http://www.nbs.go.tz/TZ_FIGURES/TZ_FIG_2008.pdf). 
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Table 3: Profile of local government authorities 
Number of  local government authorities (in 2007) 120  
Total number or local government authority workers  
( in 2007) 209,000  
Total worker compensation  
(2007 exchange rate)  $434,093,000 
Population of the most populous local government 
authority 
(2002 Census) 
2,497,940  
Average population of local government authorities  
(2002 Census) 300,000  
Average number of workers per local government 
authority 1,742 
Average annual pay per worker (in 2007) $2,080  
Sources:  United Republic of Tanzania-Local Government Information 
(www.logintanzania.net), the Tanzania National Bureau of  
Statistics (http://www.nbs.go.tz/), and calculations by the authors.  
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Table 4: Sectoral block grant allocation formulas, FY 2005-06  
Sectoral grant Allocation formula 
Primary education Number of school-aged children:  (plus earmarked amount for special schools) 100 percent 
Health services 
Population: 
Number of poor residents:  
District medical vehicle route: 
Under-five mortality:  
70 percent 
10 percent 
10 percent 
10 percent 
Agricultural and livestock 
Number of villages: 
Rural population: 
Rainfall index: 
60 percent 
20 percent 
20 percent 
Water Equal shares: Number of unserved rural residents: 
10 percent 
90 percent 
Local roads 
Road network length: 75 percent 
Land area (capped): 15 percent 
Number of poor residents: 10 percent 
75 percent 
15 percent 
10 percent 
Source: Table 8.1 in Jameson Boex and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (2006). Local Government 
Finance Reform in Developing Countries: The Case of Tanzania. New York, NY: 
Palgrave MacMillan. 
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Table 5: Ethnic fractionalization and cultural diversity in sub-Saharan Africa 
Country 
(descending order of ethnic fractionalization) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
Cultural 
fractionalization 
Rank of cultural 
fractionalization 
1. Tanzania 0.953 0.564 14 
2. Democratic Republic of Congo 0.933 0.628 7 
3. Uganda 0.930 0.647 5 
4. Liberia 0.899 0.644 6 
5. Cameroon 0.887 0.733 1 
6. Togo 0.883 0.602 8 
7. South Africa 0.880 0.530 20 
8. Congo 0.878 0.562 15 
9. Madagascar 0.861 0.192 36 
10. Gabon 0.857 0.382 29 
11. Kenya 0.852 0.601 9 
12. Ghana 0.846 0.388 28 
13. Malawi 0.829 0.294 31 
14. Guinea Bissau 0.818 0.568 13 
15. Somalia 0.812 0.290 32 
16. Nigeria 0.805 0.660 4 
17. Central African Republic 0.791 0.511 21 
18. Ivory Coast 0.784 0.557 17 
19. Chad 0.772 0.727 2 
20. Mozambique 0.765 0.285 33 
21. Gambia 0.764 0.548 18 
22. Sierra Leone 0.764 0.534 19 
23. Ethiopia 0.760 0.562 16 
24. Angola 0.756 0.242 35 
25. Mali 0.754 0.590 11 
26. Senegal 0.727 0.402 25 
27. Zambia 0.726 0.189 37 
28. Namibia 0.724 0.589 12 
29. Sudan 0.708 0.698 3 
30. Burkina Faso 0.704 0.354 30 
31. Guinea 0.669 0.490 22 
32. Eritrea 0.647 0.398 27 
33. Niger 0.637 0.600 10 
34. Mauritius 0.632 0.448 23 
35. Mauritania 0.625 0.272 34 
36. Benin 0.622 0.400 26 
37. Djibouti 0.606 0.404 24 
38. Zibabwe 0.366 0.141 40 
39. Botswana 0.351 0.161 38 
40. Burundi 0.328 0.040 42 
41. Swaziland 0.280 0.143 39 
42. Lesotho 0.255 0.057 41 
43. Rwanda 0.180 0.00 43 
Source: Appendix of  James D. Fearon (2003). “Ethnic and cultural diversity by country”. Journal of Economic 
Growth 8: 195-222. 
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Table 6: Total local government own-source revenues,  
fiscal year 2006-07 (millions of Tanzanian shillings) 
Type of tax Revenue Percent  of total  
Property taxes   5.476    9.0 
Land rent   1.332    2.0 
Produce cess 13.118   21.0 
Service levy 15.138   25.0 
Guest house levy   1.127     2.0 
Licenses   1.470     2.0 
Fees, permits and charges 14.631   24.0 
Other own revenues   9.115   15.0 
Total own revenues 61.411 100.0 
  Source: PMO-RALG, Local Government Fiscal Review 2007. 
 
 
Table 7:  
Shares of gross domestic product by sector, in 2007 
Agriculture 45.3 percent 
Industry 17.4 percent 
Services 37.3 percent 
   Source: The World Bank 
 
